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Introduction
Mutualisms are ubiquitous, with most species on the planet participating in at least one mutualism (Bronstein 2001) . Furthermore, mutualisms can be an important force structuring communities (e.g., Klironomos et al. 2011) . However, mutualisms are only one conditional outcome of species interactions. Interactions that can result in positive outcomes for the participating species may sometimes result in neutral (or even negative) outcomes, depending on the ecological context in which the inter-action occurs (Bronstein 1994) . The traits of interacting species, species abundances, and environmental conditions can all affect how beneficial a mutualism is (Lekberg and Koide 2005; Hoeksema et al. 2010 ). Many ecologists have recognized the "context dependency" of mutualisms, but it has been difficult to understand which factors determine the outcome. Context dependency thus complicates our understanding of how mutualisms structure communities. Explaining the context-dependent outcome of species interactions continues to be one of the most pressing questions facing ecologists (Agrawal et al. 2007) .
Although the outcome of mutualism can vary, all mutualisms share at least one feature: trade. One partner in a mutualism receives some good or service from the other and, in exchange, provides its partner some good or service in what can be considered a biological market (Noë and Hammerstein 1995) . Bronstein (2001) identified three major classes of mutualisms (protection, transportation, and nutritional mutualisms), and trade occurs in each class. However, it may be easiest to quantify trade in nutritional mutualisms, which involve reciprocal fluxes of resources such as sugar, nitrogen, or phosphorus. Understanding the fluxes into and out of each organism may help elucidate variation in the outcome of mutualisms.
Allocation to direct uptake and the exchange ratio are two key features of trade that can cause variation in the outcome of mutualisms. Organisms may influence the amount traded by adjusting their allocation to direct uptake of the resources exchanged. An organism might "invest" in its partner by increasing uptake of the resource it trades away. For example, plants supporting belowground nutritional mutualists such as rhizobia or mycorrhizal fungi might increase carbon uptake (photosynthesis) in order to increase carbon supply to their partner (Miller et al. 2002) . However, optimal allocation to either trade or independent uptake will depend on how efficiently each partner can provide the resource. When each partner is relatively more efficient at taking up the resource it trades away than the partner receiving the resource, conditions of relative ad-vantage exist (Ricardo 1817; Schwartz and Hoeksema 1998) . Under these conditions, it is thought that optimal allocation should lead to partners specializing on uptake of the resource they trade away (Schwartz and Hoeksema 1998) . For plants and belowground mutualists, this would mean that the plant should specialize on carbon uptake, while the belowground mutualist should specialize on nutrient provisioning. However, empirical data indicate that plants do not always allocate carbon to belowground mutualists (Johnson 2010) , suggesting that there may be variation in the optimal strategy. To understand the outcome of mutualisms, we must understand the partners' optimal allocation strategies and deviations from those strategies.
The second key feature of trade is the exchange ratio. The gains obtained from trade depend on the cost (what is exchanged away) and the benefit (what is received in return). In other words, the ratio at which resources are exchanged may affect whether a mutualism is beneficial or not (Schwartz and Hoeksema 1998) . Under conditions of relative advantage, it is possible to identify a range of favorable exchange ratios where resource acquisition is "cheaper" for both partners through trade (Schwartz and Hoeksema 1998) . If trade at a favorable exchange ratio is enforced, the mutualism will be evolutionarily stable (McGill 2005) .
However, even among mutually beneficial exchange ratios, variation could cause differences in the degree to which partners benefit from the mutualism. Each partner would gain the most by minimizing its cost and maximizing its benefit (Schwartz and Hoeksema 1998; Bronstein 2001) , creating a conflict of interest between the partners. Although this conflict of interest could lead to selection for one partner to "cheat" and obtain the benefit of trade without paying the cost (West et al. 2002) , Bronstein (2001) points out that this need not be the case for all mutualisms. Furthermore, many mutualisms typically result in positive outcomes for both partners (Karst et al. 2008; Chamberlain and Holland 2009; Hoeksema et al. 2010) , suggesting that partners somehow negotiate a mutually beneficial exchange ratio. Thus, even in the absence of antagonism, variation in the exchange ratio is important. To determine how the partners would solve this conflict of interest to negotiate a single mutually beneficial exchange ratio, Akçay and Roughgarden (2007a) built a mechanistic model of trade between rhizobia and legumes. The negotiated exchange ratio turned out to be identical to the Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950 (Nash , 1953 , an outcome commonly found in cooperative game theory (Akçay and Roughgarden 2007a) . However, they did not explore the context dependency of this negotiated exchange ratio, whether it would interact with the partners' allocation strategies, or whether it would explain variation in the outcome of the mutualism.
We asked what determines these two key features of trade-allocation and the exchange ratio-and how they predict the degree to which two partners gain from a mutualistic interaction. We then varied species traits and resource availability to explore the relationship's context dependency. Uniting and building on the key results of Akçay and Roughgarden (2007a) and Schwartz and Hoeksema (1998) , we modeled a classic example of a nutritional mutualism, plants and mycorrhizal fungi. In this interaction, fungi develop a network of hyphae in the soil and plant roots. Plants transfer photosynthetically fixed carbon to the fungi in exchange for benefits, primarily soil nutrients (Smith and Read 1997) . Plants are capable of taking up nutrients directly, but mycorrhizal fungi could be more efficient because, per unit length, hyphae require less carbon to build than roots (Smith and Read 1997) . Therefore plant allocation to mycorrhizae may be a better investment than allocation toward direct uptake of nutrients. Plants and fungi differ in their relative requirements for carbon and nutrients, which could also affect the benefit of trade (Hoeksema and Schwartz 2003) . Empirically, plant benefit from fungi is highly variable and incompletely understood. A meta-analysis of hundreds of studies explained only 23%-41% of variation in plant benefit, despite including at least eight important predictor variables such as species identity, species traits, and soil fertility (Hoeksema et al. 2010 ). This suggests that not all important predictor variables could be included in that analysis. In particular, context-dependent variation in the fluxes of carbon and soil nutrients is insufficiently understood.
We modeled trade between a plant and a fungus able to take up a soil nutrient and carbon in conditions of relative advantage (Schwartz and Hoeksema 1998) and negotiate an exchange ratio according to the Nash bargaining solution (Akçay and Roughgarden 2007a ) on a very short (behavioral) timescale. Antagonistic outcomes are not an option in this framework, but the model does predict variation in the magnitude of benefit the partners experience. Although we discuss the model in the context of a specific example (plants and arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi), it is conceptually applicable to all mutualisms because all involve trade. This model allows us to answer three ecological questions: (1) Will both partners specialize on uptake of the resource traded away? (2) What exchange ratio will they negotiate? (3) Can these two features of trade help explain why key predictors fail to fully explain variation in the outcome of mycorrhizal mutualisms? We parameterized the model to explore realistic ranges of critical ecological factors, specifically the traits of the partners (resource uptake efficiency), community structure (relative abundances), and the availability of resources thought to be particularly important to this mutualism (light and a soil nutrient).
The Model
We model plant growth rate per unit biomass (g P ) as the lesser of the growth allowed by two limiting resources, carbon (C) and a soil nutrient (N for nutrient). We model the plant as a population consisting of a single clonal individual. Plant acquisition of available nutrient is the sum of direct uptake and nutrient gained in trade. The nutrient taken up is evenly distributed throughout the plant's biomass. The rate of direct uptake per unit biomass is f NP , which can be thought of as a function of available nutrient in the soil and allocation of effort to direct uptake. The amount of the nutrient obtained through trade is determined by X, the total flux of carbon exchange (summed across all plant biomass), and by T, the C : N exchange ratio that determines how much carbon the plant trades away for a given amount of the nutrient. The amount of growth allowed by the plant's nutrient income is the product of its nutrient acquisition and the yield of biomass per unit nutrient (Y NP ). Similarly, the net rate of plant acquisition of carbon is the difference between photosynthetically driven carbon assimilation (f CP ) and carbon lost in trade, which is converted into carbonlimited growth rate by Y CP .
We model growth of a single, clonally spreading individual fungus (g F ) similarly, except that the fungus gains carbon and loses nutrient as a result of trade. Note that the fungus is capable of direct carbon uptake, so this model is appropriate for both arbuscular ( ) and ectomycorrhizal f p 0 CF fungi ( ), as well as other nutritional mutualisms such f 1 0 CF as lichens, corals, and legumes and rhizobia.
Henceforth we measure species biomass in terms of carbon, so we set the yield coefficients with-
out loss of generality; in this case Y NP and Y NF represent the C : N stoichiometry of the plant and fungus, respectively. We assume that the plant and the fungus can modify the amount of nutrient and carbon taken up by adjusting allocation to resource uptake over short behavioral timescales. At this timescale, allocation occurs on a physiological scale, for example, through altering phosphorus uptake or carbon fixation machinery. Slower allocation adjustment, for example, through changes in root : shoot ratio, results in qualitatively similar results (appendix, "Reallocation of Uptake Machinery Slower than Negotiation," available online). We model allocation as the proportion of effort dedicated to obtaining one resource at the expense of the other. We assume a linear trade-off (Klausmeier et al. 2007) , so that plant allocation for nutrient uptake is A NP and allocation for carbon uptake is ; fungus 1 Ϫ A NP allocation for carbon uptake is A CF , and allocation for nutrient uptake is . Therefore, ,
, and .
We consider nonlinear trade-offs in the appendix, "Extension to Nonlinear Trade-offs." Efficiencies of direct resource uptake rates ( , , , and ) and ). We assume that the interactions modeled here f CP (allocation decisions and exchange ratio negotiations) take place on much faster timescales than changes in species abundances or nutrient availabilities, which we treat as fixed parameters rather than dynamic variables. Note that although the plant and the fungus take up carbon and nutrient through very different mechanisms (e.g., the plant fixes carbon through photosynthesis in the leaves and takes up the nutrient through the roots, while the fungus takes up the soil nutrient and potentially carbon through extraradical hyphae), these differences do not matter because we do not model resource depletion. In addition to these species-specific or environmental contexts, plant and fungus growth also depend on the amount of resources obtained through trade, which could also depend on those specific contexts.
Model Analysis
To understand how the two key features of trade, allocation and the exchange ratio, affect the outcome of trade, we analyze the effect of environmental parameters on three interrelated factors: the total amount of carbon exchanged (X), allocation to uptake of the resource each species is better at obtaining (A NP , A CF ), and the exchange ratio (T). Modeling the outcome of trade between the plant and the mycorrhizal fungus requires that we solve these three problems simultaneously, but we will describe them sequentially to build up the problem. First, we will examine what determines the volume of trade (X) for fixed allocation (A NP , A CF ) and exchange ratio (T). Second, given X, we then allow the plant and the fungus to optimize A NP and A CF to maximize their growth rates. Finally, we allow the plant and the fungus to negotiate T while simultaneously determining X and optimizing A NP and A CF . All three problems are solved 
)
.004-.007 Pearson and Jakobsen 1993; Kiers et al. 2011 Note: See appendix, "Calculations of Parameter Values," available online, for details of calculations. We use phosphorus as the soil nutrient (N) and assume 50% of biomass is carbon (C). Where possible, values for plant parameters are taken from Andropogon gerardii (big bluestem), Bromus inermis (smooth brome), and Elymus repens (quackgrass).
simultaneously and organisms can adjust the volume of carbon exchanged, allocation, and the exchange ratio over very short, behavioral (physiological) timescales. Details of the analysis are presented in the appendix, "Model Analysis," and a zip file with Mathematica code is provided as supplementary material, available online.
What Determines X, the Total Amount of Resources Exchanged?
Clearly, the amount of carbon and nutrient traded will determine how beneficial the interaction is for both partners. In general, one partner or the other will limit the amount traded by failing to produce enough resource to match its partner's production. A1 ). The optimal allocation strategy is best for both partners, even though each partner acts selfishly to maximize its growth rate given the allocation strategy of its partner.
How Will the Plant and the Fungus Negotiate the Exchange Ratio T?
Above, we showed that if exchange ratios are favorable to both partners (
cisions by one partner consistently benefit the other partner and there is no conflict. However, there is conflict in the third problem that the plant and the fungus must simultaneously solve: negotiating the C : N exchange ratio T. Each partner gains more from trade when T is closer to the ratio at which the other partner takes up carbon and the nutrient directly ( fig. 1 ). Plant gain from trade is 0 when T is equal to the plant C : N uptake ratio ( / f CP , the isolation cost ratio in Schwartz and Hoeksema f NP 1998). Plant gain from trade increases when nutrient becomes cheaper (relative to carbon) through trade than it is through direct uptake. In contrast, the fungus benefits from trade whenever T is greater than the fungal C : N uptake ratio ( / ), with gain from trade increasing as f f CF NF T increases. How do the plant and the fungus settle on a single, mutually acceptable T when they have competing interests? One solution to this bargaining problem is the Nash bargaining solution (NBS; Nash 1953), which is the strategy that maximizes the product of the gains to both players (the Nash product). The NBS was originally derived on the basis of an axiomatic approach (Nash 1953 ) but has been shown to be the optimal solution of a model of strategic bargaining (Binmore et al. 1986 ). The NBS has been applied to a wide variety of social and economic situations (van Damme 1986; Border and Segal 1997) but only recently introduced to ecology (Roughgarden et al. 2006; Akçay and Roughgarden 2007a) . As an assumption of an alternative theory of evolution to sexual selection, the NBS has been controversial (McNamara et al. 2006; Roughgarden et al. 2006; Akçay and Roughgarden 2007b) . However, Akçay and Roughgarden (2007a) demonstrated that a negotiation model based on offers and rejections or acceptances of nutrient fluxes between two mututalists leads to the NBS. In that model, each partner acts individualistically to increase its own gain from trade. We assume that such flux-based negotiations take place between a plant and a mycorrhizal fungus, and therefore adopt the NBS to solve the third problem of how the plant and the fungus will negotiate the exchange ratio T (see appendix, "How Will the Plant and the Fungus Negotiate the Exchange Ratio T?"). The NBS assumes only that partners can sense the resource they receive from trade, a reasonable assumption in plant-mycorrhizal interactions (Bücking and Shachar-Hill 2005; Javot et al. 2007 ).
The Nash product P (eq.
[A24]) is the product of the gains to the two partners. Because fitness depends on whether the plant or the fungus limits trade, the Nash product can be composed as the minimum of two unimodal curves, and the NBS is the maximum of the minimum of these two curves ( fig. A2 ). There are three candidate points for this maximum: the maximum of plant-limited Nash product (eq. [A25a]), the maximum of fungus-limited Nash product (eq. [A25b] ), or the intersection of the two curves (eq. [A25c]; Abrams 1987). The NBS, T*, is the T of these three candidates that leads to the largest P. This comparison also determines whether trade is plant-, fungus-, or colimited and therefore determines the optimal allocation strategies of the partners. When trade is ultimately plant limited the plant specializes on carbon uptake at the NBS (fig. A2A) ; when trade is ultimately fungus limited the fungus specializes on nutrient uptake at the NBS (fig. A2C) ; when trade is colimited both partners allocate optimally to take up only the resource they trade away ( fig. A2B) .
Having solved the volume of resource exchanged, how the plant and the fungus optimally allocate to uptake of carbon and nutrient and at what ratio they exchange carbon for nutrient, we will now explore how these variables depend on organismal traits (stoichiometry and uptake efficiencies), community structure (relative abundances), and environmental conditions (resource availability). We will also explore how the two key features of trade, allocation and the exchange ratio, affect plant and fungal gain from trade. We define gain from trade as the difference between growth rate with trade and growth rate without trade.
Effect of Environmental and Species Parameters on the Identity of the Specialist Partner
A key result of our model is that environmental and species characteristics determine which partner will specialize in uptake of the resource traded away by determining which partner limits trade. In general, the flows of the soil nutrient N and carbon C into negotiations and the demand for those resources determine which partner comes up short. This partner limits trade, failing to provide enough of the resource it trades away to satisfy both its own requirements and its partner's requirements. This occurs even though the limiting partner adjusts allocation to specialize on uptake of the resource it trades away and eliminates uptake of the other resource. The nonlimiting partner, on the other hand, is a generalist and takes up both resources directly from the environment. For example, when the fungus limits trade, the fungus cannot supply enough nutrient even when it acts as a nutrient specialist, eliminating direct carbon uptake and allocating toward maximal nutrient uptake. Its plant partner therefore acts as a generalist, allocating to uptake of both nutrient and carbon (for its own use and to trade away). In the case of colimitation, both partners specialize on uptake of the resource traded away.
What Determines Which Partner Will Specialize?
To determine when each partner should specialize, we parameterized the model with values from the literature on the symbiosis between temperate grasses and arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi (table 1) . We assume that each partner exists in a homogenous, clonally spreading population where resources taken up are instantaneously evenly distributed across the population. We study soil phosphorus as the soil nutrient, modeling uptake as a type II functional response. We assume that the fungus cannot directly take up carbon from the environment ( ; Smith and f p 0 CF Read 1997) and model plant carbon uptake as photosynthesis, which is a function of light availability. We run the model with all 1,024 possible combinations of the extremes of empirically derived parameters (table 1) and record the identity of the specialist (limiting) partner. Fungal specialization on phosphorus uptake occurs in 89% of combinations of environmental conditions and species traits, 10% of combinations result in plant specialization on carbon uptake, and 1% result in the borderline case where the plant specializes on carbon uptake and the fungus specializes on phosphorus uptake.
Using a classification tree (library tree in R, ver. 2.12.1), we determine which parameters are most important in determining the identity of the specialist (limiting) partner ( fig. 2) . Given the range of empirically measured parameter values, the availability of soil phosphorus is the most important determinant of the identity of the specialist, accounting for 22% of the total deviance. If phosphorus is low, the fungus always specializes on phosphorus uptake and the plant is a generalist, taking up both carbon and phosphorus directly. If phosphorus is high, the identity of the specialist is determined by fungus maximum phosphorus uptake rate. If the fungus has low capacity for phosphorus uptake, the fungus is the specialist partner in 254 of 256 cases.
If phosphorus is high and fungus maximum uptake rate is high, fungal abundance becomes important in determining the identity of the specialist ( fig. 2) . When the fungus is small, the plant is the specialist in only 4 of 128 cases. All of these cases are associated with very low carbon inputs into the symbiosis (low plant maximum photosynthetic rate, small plant biomass, low light availability, and high plant C : phosphorus ratio). On the other hand, when the fungus is large, the plant specializes on carbon uptake in most cases (96/128). This tendency is especially pronounced when carbon inputs into the symbiosis are low.
Over all the empirically derived ranges of the parameters we investigate, the three most important (phosphorus (table 1) for maximum photosynthetic rate (V CP ), photosynthetic rate halfsaturation constant (K CP ), carbon : phosphorus stoichiometries of the fungus (Y NF ) and plant (Y NP ), biomasses of the plant (P) and fungus (F), light availability, and soil phosphorus availability. We use the extremes of measured phosphorus uptake efficiencies ( and from f f NP NF availability, fungal maximum phosphorus uptake rate, and fungal abundance) account for 67% of the variation in the identity of the specialist. Less important parameters determine the identity of the specialist partner for some combinations of those three parameters (figs. A3, A4). These less important parameters include plant biomass, light availability, and plant species traits such as the maximum rate of photosynthesis and carbon : phosphorus stoichiometry. The remaining parameters, fungal carbon : phosphorus stoichiometry, plant maximum phosphorus uptake rate, and plant photosynthetic half-saturation constant, do not appear in the tree. These unimportant parameters occasionally cause variation within the terminal nodes of the tree but explain only 12% of total deviance in the identity of the specialist. Because our model is deterministic, this variation in the terminal nodes is not error, so we did not perform cross-validation or calculate a misclassification table (Urban 2002 ; see also Crawley 2007) . Instead, we interpret these parameters as unimportant in determining the identity of the specialist partner, perhaps because the ranges of empirically derived parameters are too small to have much effect. 
What Are the Consequences of Changes in the Identity of the Specialist Partner?
To better understand the causes and consequences of changes in the identity of the specialist partner in the arbuscular mycorrhizal symbiosis, we examine a few combinations of parameters in detail. The availability of resources, especially phosphorus, affects the identity of the specialist partner ( fig. 2) . When light (carbon) availability is low ( fig. 3A, 3C, 3E ), a habitat with low soil phosphorus would have a specialist fungus and a generalist plant. In these conditions, fungal uptake of scarce phosphorus cannot satisfy fungus and plant requirements, so the plant allocates to direct phosphorus uptake as well as carbon uptake. Increases in soil phosphorus within this fungusspecialist region would increase the fungus's ability to trade away phosphorus, increasing the total flux of carbon and increasing both partners' gains from trade but having no effect on the exchange ratio. A habitat with higher soil phosphorus, on the other hand, would allow the fungus to provide enough phosphorus and would challenge the plant to take up enough carbon, leading to both partners specializing on uptake of the resource they trade away (colimited trade). When both partners specialize, increases in soil phosphorus drive up the exchange ratio ( fig. 3A ). 
This occurs because, when both partners specialize, only the fungus can take up the phosphorus that would increase both partners' growth rates; this power allows the fungus to negotiate very high exchange ratios that favor the fungus ( fig. 1 ). These higher exchange ratios increase the total amount of carbon the plant trades away ( fig. 3A) , increasing fungal gain from trade but decreasing plant gain from trade ( fig. 3C, 3E ). Further increases in soil phosphorus and consequent increases in the exchange ratio and the flux of carbon traded away mean that the plant can no longer supply enough carbon to satisfy both partners. At this level of phosphorus, the plant must continue to specialize on carbon uptake, but the fungus's strategy of specialization on phosphorus brings in more phosphorus than the plant can pay for. However, because the fungus is incapable of taking up carbon ( ; Smith and Read f p 0 CF 1997), changes in fungal allocation do not change fungal growth rate in this region of the generalist fungus. Therefore, in the case of plant limitation, we assume the fungus continues to function as a specialist, even though there is selection for it to be a generalist. At high carbon (light) availability, the pattern is similar ( fig. 3B, 3D, 3F ), but both partners specialize at the highest phosphorus availability examined. Therefore, changes in the identity of the specialist (limiting) partner have important effects on how carbon flux between partners, the exchange ratio, and plant and fungal gain from trade respond to increases in phosphorus availability.
Fungus phosphorus uptake is also an important determinant of the identity of the specialist (limiting) partner ( fig. 2 ). Examining this parameter more closely, we find that increases in fungus phosphorus uptake efficiency can switch the identity of the specialist from the fungus, to both partners, to only the plant ( fig. 4A ). A fungus with very low phosphorus uptake efficiency is unable to take up enough phosphorus to satisfy plant requirements even though it specializes on phosphorus uptake. The plant associating with this fungus is a generalist, allocating to both carbon and phosphorus uptake. As long as the fungus is the specialist, a fungus with higher phosphorus uptake would be able to increase the total amount of carbon exchanged between partners; this increased trade volume would increase both partners' gains from trade. However, a fungus with even higher phosphorus uptake efficiency could satisfy plant phosphorus requirements, allowing the plant to specialize on carbon uptake ( fig. 4A ), increasing the carbon exchanged even further because trade would be the plant's only phosphorus source. In this region, the exchange ratio increases, again because the fungus' monopoly on phosphorus uptake allows it to negotiate an exchange ratio favorable to the fungus ( fig. 1) . This shift toward a much higher exchange ratio, accompanied by larger quantities of carbon exchanged, combines to result in higher fungal gain from trade and lower plant gain from trade ( fig. 4B, 4C ). A fungus with still higher phosphorus uptake efficiency can provide more than enough phosphorus for both its own requirements and plant phosphorus requirements, again resulting in a specialist plant and a fungus constrained to act as a specialist (because ) even though there is selection for it to be a genf p 0 CF eralist. Again, changes in the identity of the specialist partner affect the impacts of shifts in fungal species traits on the outcome of trade.
The biomass of each partner also contributes to determining whether the plant, the fungus, or both specialize on uptake of the resource traded away (fig. 5) . A plant with more biomass is better able to take up enough carbon to satisfy itself and its partner than a smaller plant, leaving a larger plant free to allocate to direct phosphorus uptake as well as direct carbon uptake ( fig. 5A , 5C, 5E). To understand the dynamics of trade during plant invasion of a habitat occupied only by the fungus, we investigated plant biomasses below the lowest equilibrium biomass listed in table 1 (686 g plant C m Ϫ2 ). Not surprisingly, the plant specializes on carbon uptake during invasion of new habitat. However, even above the lowest equilibrium plant biomass, the plant might still be the specialist partner ( fig.  5A ). Similarly, a fungus invading a new habitat would specialize ( fig. 5B, 5D, 5F ). However, in habitat where the fungus is more abundant, the fungus might be able to take up enough phosphorus to satisfy both plant and fungus requirements. Therefore, with increases in fungus biomass, trade would transition from fungus specialization, to both partners specializing, to plant specialization. Again, changes in the identity of the specialist partner affects whether changes in parameters increase, decrease, or have no effect on the exchange ratio and plant and fungal gain from trade.
These results reveal two important points. First, the identity of the specialist partner affects the impacts of changes in parameters on the outcome of the symbiosis. In figures 3-5, sharp breakpoints in the curves occur wherever the identity of the specialist partner switches. Increases in species uptake efficiencies, biomass, or environmental characteristics can increase the total volume of carbon exchanged, the exchange ratio, or plant and fungal gain from trade while one partner specializes, but decrease them (or have no effect) when the other partner specializes. Second, changes in plant and fungal gain from trade in response to changes in parameter values are frequently counter-intuitive. While the exchange ratio is always negotiated according to the Nash bargaining solution, some exchange ratios are nearer the lower bound of the beneficial range of trade, an exchange ratio more favorable for the plant ( fig. 1 ). Other exchange ratios are nearer the upper bound of the beneficial range of trade, benefitting the fungus more than the plant. Understanding these results relies on knowledge of the identity of the specialist partner and the exchange ratio.
Discussion

Specialization
In contrast to Schwartz and Hoeksema (1998) , who suggested that specialization by both partners should be common, our results suggest that this is not the only possible outcome: it is common for one of the partners to specialize and for the other partner to act as a generalist, taking up both resources directly from the environment. In the case of diminishing returns on investment in uptake machinery, it is possible for both species to experience selection for uptake of both resources (appendix, "Extension to Nonlinear Trade-Offs"), but this does not occur for the empirically derived parameter values (table 1) .
In the majority of cases in our simulations of plant interactions with arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi, the fungus is the specialist partner, while the plant takes up both carbon and phosphorus. This finding is reassuring, because it is backed by empirical observations that the plant photosynthesizes and takes up soil nutrients and that the fungus only takes up soil nutrients. Because the fungus is the specialist partner in most environments it encounters, it is tempting to speculate that it may have experienced selection for the loss of its direct carbon uptake machinery. This hypothesis could explain the apparent evolution of specialization in arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi: in other words, it may explain why arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi apparently cannot take up carbon from the environment.
However, our simulations reveal a few cases where the plant is the specialist partner. This occurs even though we simulate the arbuscular mycorrhizal case, where the fungus is incapable of direct carbon uptake and is thus incapable of acting as a generalist. In plant specialist situations where the fungus can take up more phosphorus than both organisms can use, the surplus phosphorus is simply lost, and fungus growth rate is flat with respect to fungal allocation. In another mutualism where both partners are capable of acting as generalists ( ), such as the ecf 1 0 CF tomycorrhizal symbiosis (e.g., Vaario et al. 2011) , the fungus would act as a generalist and increase its growth rate by increasing independent carbon uptake.
Interestingly, there may be empirical support for the idea that plants could specialize on carbon uptake and eliminate direct phosphorus uptake when associating with arbuscular mycorrhizas (Smith et al. 2009 ). In fact, suppression of plant direct phosphorus uptake may be proportional to the amount of phosphorus received from the fungus (Burleigh et al. 2002) .
Combined with empirical evidence suggesting that the identity of the specialist partner in the arbuscular mycorrhizal symbiosis may actually vary, our finding that the identity of the specialist partner affects the outcome of trade is intriguing. It suggests that some of the context dependency in plant-mycorrhizal interactions may indeed be driven by variation in the identity of the specialist partner.
Exchange Ratio
With a few notable exceptions (Hoeksema and Bruna 2000; McGill 2005; Akçay and Roughgarden 2007a; Golubski and Klausmeier 2010) , relatively little theoretical work has explored the implications of variation in the exchange ratio. However, the exchange of benefits lies at the heart of any mutualism. Our results support this idea: the exchange ratio affected how much each partner gained from trade, even though exchange ratios are required to be mutually beneficial. These changes sometimes coincide with the expectation that lower carbon : nutrient exchange ratios would benefit the plant and that higher exchange ratios would benefit the fungus. However, this was not always the case. Changes in the identity of the specialist interact with changes in the exchange ratio to determine gain from trade.
We modeled negotiation using the Nash bargaining solution because it is appropriate for exchanges of resources between single individuals of two guilds (Akçay and Roughgarden 2007a) . In nature, however, it is typical for plants to associate with multiple species of mycorrhizal fungus, and similarly for fungi to associate with many plants (van der Heijden and Horton 2009). It is not clear that the Nash bargaining solution will be appropriate to predict the outcome of negotiation when either or both partners can chose from among many potential partners. In particular, incorporating partner choice could substan-tially change the dynamics of negotiation, possibly allowing the limiting partner to negotiate a more favorable exchange ratio. Other work has shown that partner choice can affect the negotiated exchange ratio as well as the benefits each partner gains from the association (Golubski and Klausmeier 2010; Akçay and Simms 2011) and also may determine community structure and diversity (Kummel and Salant 2006), so examining partner choice in negotiation is an important direction for future work. Furthermore, the Nash bargaining solution requires that partners can enforce this negotiated exchange ratio (in other words, cheating is not allowed) and that both partners benefit from the interaction and neither partner be parasitized. Therefore, the NBS is not appropriate for modeling the mutualism-parasitism continuum observed in arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi (Johnson et al. 1997; Hoeksema et al. 2010) . Clearly, incorporating parasitism, nonenforceable exchange ratios, or partner choice into a model of negotiation would invalidate the use of the NBS and could have profound effects on the outcome of trade, both ecologically and evolutionarily (McGill 2005) .
A few empirical studies have measured variation in the exchange ratio in the arbuscular mycorrhizal symbiosis and linked it to fungal species traits (Pearson and Jakobsen 1993) and resource availability (Kiers et al. 2011) . However, too few studies have reported exchange ratios, and none in conjunction with the identity of the specialist, so it is too early to test our model's predictions. The exchange ratio may be even more difficult to measure in mutualisms where behaviors such as pollination or protection are exchanged. The exchange ratio thus remains understudied, but our results highlight its potential importance for understanding mutualisms.
Gain From Trade
The net effect of the arbuscular mycorrhizal symbiosis ranges widely (Hoeksema et al. 2010) . Several aspects of the context are thought to affect the outcome, including resource availability, the relative abundances of the partners, and the identity of the partners, probably because of differences in traits involving resource uptake efficiency (Hetrick et al. 1992; Allison and Goldberg 2002; Lekberg and Koide 2005; Hoeksema et al. 2010 ). However, 59%-77% of variation in plant growth remained unexplained in a meta-analysis (Hoeksema et al. 2010 ). This surprisingly large amount of residual variation in the outcome of the mutualism suggests that not all important predictors have been examined. In particular, those investigators were unable to include analyses of the uptake and trade of carbon and soil nutrients. In other words, trade itself (the reciprocal flux of resources) has not been adequately studied.
Our model suggests that two aspects of trade may be important predictor variables. We found that both the identity of the specialist and the exchange ratio help determine the degree to which the plant and the fungus gain from trade. Variation in these two factors is driven by changes in extrinsic forces such as environmental conditions and species traits. However, these two factors also affect the impact of the extrinsic forces. In fact, the partners' gains from trade could increase, decrease, or remain constant with changes in resource availability, the partners' resource uptake efficiencies, or the partners' biomasses, depending on the identity of the specialist and the exchange ratio. Without knowing the identity of the specialist and the exchange ratio, this variation in the response of plant and fungal benefit to environmental drivers would appear to be highly variable and unpredictable, as it does in the recent meta-analysis (Hoeksema et al. 2010) . However, radioactive isotopes, genetic techniques, or other methods may make identification of the specialist possible (Smith et al. 2009) . Measuring the exchange ratio should also be possible (Kiers et al. 2011) . By identifying the specialist and quantifying variation in the exchange ratio along gradients of key variables such as phosphorus availability, fungal phosphorus uptake efficiency, and fungal biomass, we may be able to explain much of this residual variation in the outcome of the mutualism.
Broader Theoretical Context
Previous models of trade have made important advances in understanding the exchanges of costs and benefits in mutualisms. These models have considered the conditions under which trade could evolve (McGill 2005; de Mazancourt and Schwartz 2010) and could result in a range of positive to negative impacts on populations based on resource availability (Neuhauser and Fargione 2004) or density-dependent functional responses to partners (Holland et al. 2002) . Another approach has more explicitly considered costs and benefits by modeling mutualisms as a consumer-resource interaction (Holland and DeAngelis 2010) . These and other models (Hoeksema and Bruna 2000; Okuyama and Holland 2008) have also asked whether mutualism can affect community structure. However, none of these have investigated the impacts of behaviorally plastic allocation to trade as opposed to independent resource acquisition, clearly an important determinant of the magnitude and therefore the impact of trade on individuals and communities.
Although we have analyzed and interpreted our model for the specific example of the plant-arbuscular mycorrhizal mutualism, many of the central concepts are applicable to other kinds of mutualisms. All mutualisms require the exchange of one benefit for another. Some of these benefits may be costly for partners to provide, opening up the possibility that there may be a conflict of interest in determining the magnitude of provisioning (Bronstein 2001) . Negotiation of the exchange ratio is therefore likely to be a critical issue in determining the outcome of the interaction. Furthermore, some mutualists may be capable of adjusting allocation to provisioning their partner. Flexible allocation to provisioning raises questions about the optimal allocation strategy, and whether either partner (or both) will specialize on provisioning and becoming an obligate mutualist. Our model is thus conceptually applicable to a wide range of mutualisms.
By uniting two previously disparate fields of theory, we have gained new insight into two factors that should determine the outcome of mutualisms. Specifically, we have incorporated aspects of a biological market (Schwartz and Hoeksema 1998) and negotiation (Akçay and Roughgarden 2007a) . By combining these two modeling approaches, we are able to show that a mutualist's decision to specialize on uptake of a single resource can affect the exchange ratio it negotiates with its partner. We also show that both of these factors, allocation and the exchange ratio, can combine with other important ecological drivers to determine the outcome of trade.
